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The study of the mortgage market consists of two major parts. The
first consists of cross-section studies, the second of time series. Cross-
section analyses are based on data from five sources: the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the Bureau of the Census, the Federal National
Mortgage Association, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,1 and some
large life insurance companies that cooperated in providing new data
for our project. For cross-section purposes we drew a 100 per cent sam-
ple of residential mortgage loans made by five large life insurance com-
panies in June 1953, together with a similar 100 per cent coverage
of all such loans made by six companies in February 1960.
The time series study is based on monthly samples of mortgage loans
made by four major life insurance companies during the period Jan-
uary 1951 through December 1963. We are recording about 1,300 ob-
servations per month, and so far the evidence indicates that the sample
is large enough to provide highly reliable estimates of the yields on
all mortgage loans of these companies.
Since the collection of data for the time series is not quite finished,
our findings to date are largely from cross-section studies, though we
have significant time series insights from one large life insurance
company which, for its own purposes, compiles series on both an au-
thorization and disbursement basis.
Yield-Determining Characteristics
Many factors influence the yield on residential mortgages, including
location of property, type of lender, size of loan, loan-to-value ratio,
maturity, and income of borrower. The relative importance of these
factors is difficult to assess because of the high degree of intercorrelation
1.TheChicago Reserve Bank kindly provided us with punch cards giving data
on new mortgages authorized inits District, beginning April 1960, by thirty-six
savings and loan associations, twenty-four commercial banks, four mortgage com-
panies, and one life insurance company.20 Part II
between them and because many of the relations are not linear. For
example, a measure of risk such as the loan-to-value ratio might show
little effect on yields when it varied from 45 to 50 per cent, yet show
large effect when it varied from 90 to 95 per cent. Some factors, particu-
larly those related to risk, bear a highly significant relation to yield in
some groups of mortgages and no relationship at all in others.2 Some-
times even the apparent direction of influence of a given variable on
yield can be changed—for example, from positive to negative—by taking
account of other variables with which it is correlated. Some variables
are related to yield through two channels which are offsetting in their
effect.
LOCATION OF PROPERTY
Location of property is one of the most important variables affecting
the yield on residential mortgages. Interregional yield differentials are
well documented statistically. In addition, we have reason to believe
that significant differences exist among individual states within the
same region, between metropolitan areas and cities of different size,
between cities and suburban and rural areas, and perhaps within dif-
ferent neighborhoods of the same city.
In 1890, the Census Bureau reported that yields on residential mort-
gages were 3.8 percentage points lower in New England than in the
Rocky Mountain states. Since then a substantial portion although not
all of the interregional yield differences has been eliminated, owing
in good part to improvements in technical facilities for transferring
funds from surplus to deficit areas. Today these differentials range
generally from 1/4percent to 1 per cent, depending on how they are
measured. Whether they are continuing to narrow or whether the
narrowing process stopped in 1950 or even earlier is not clear. On con-
ventional loans made by the large life insurance companies in our
survey, the differences in both June 1953 and February 1960 were
about 1/4percent. The differentials probably vary cyclically with
fluctuations in the general level of rates, however, so that we must
await the monthly time series before drawing firm conclusions. In
any case, it is clear from Census data that any narrowing that has
occurred since 1950 has been small.
2Groupsare classified by type of lender, type of property (new or existing), and
sometimes by characteristics of loan or of borrower (e.g., ratios of loan to asset value,
or of borrower's income to loan size).The Mortgage Market 21
The causes of regional yield differentials are well known. They
stem basically from different rates of economic growth. The more in-
teresting question is why they have not been completely eliminated
by the development of the federal underwriting programs and by the
yield-leveling influence of loans made by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association and by private lenders that operate nation-wide, par-
ticularly the life insurance companies. Since lenders earn higher yields
on mortgages in the deficit regions, why do they not continue to shift
their loans to those areas until the differential is eliminated? One
reason is a desire to have some sort of geographical diversification in
their mortgage portfolios, thereby averaging out risks of a regional
nature. The need for diversification is reinforced in some cases by
the feeling that higher-yielding mortgages from the faster-growing
states may be more risky. In addition, some companies evidently feel
that they should make some mortgage loans in areas where they sell
insurance.
A second part of the explanation of the continued regional yield
differential is that lending at a distance may be more costly. This
probably would not be the case if a perfect market existed for the
services of specialists who keep properties under surveillance and col-
lect interest and amortization payments. However, this market is
demonstrably imperfect, though it has become increasingly competi-
tive over the long run; this is one aspect of the improvement in tech-
nical facilities noted above.
A third part of the explanation, which Guttentag is beginning to
unravel, is that because of various types of market imperfections some
local submarkets are more or less shielded from the full force of the
leveling influence of the national lenders. Apparently reflecting these
imperfections, regional yield differentials are much wider for local
lenders than for national lenders. They appear also to be wider on
loans secured by existing properties than on those secured by new
properties, where the influence of national lenders is mainly directed.
Regional yield differentials are also higher on loans secured by prop-
erties of relatively low value. It is plausible that value serves as proxy
for many influences associated with the degree of market segmentation.
Very old properties, for example, are of lower average value than new
properties and are generally shunned by national lenders.
Little is yet known about the other causes of locational yield dif-
ferentials. Among the factors that Guttentag believes worth investigat-22 PartII
ing are state laws regarding foreclosures; taxes and other penalties on
out-of-state lenders, and taxes and restrictions on state institutions
lending out-of-state; and the influence of financial structure (the num-
ber and type of financial institutions in different areas). The latter
has important implications for public policy with regard to such mat-
ters as branching and mergers.
TYPE OF LENDER
Guttentag has recently prepared a progress report describing a num-
ber of yield-determining characteristics. Part of what follows is quoted
from that report.
It is well known that mortgage yields differ by type of lender. Table 2
shows that on conventional loans differences between the highest- and lowest-
rate lenders (savings and loan associations and insurance companies) exceed
percent.
The most obvious hypothesis explaining these rate differences is that the
lenders deal in different markets. To begin with, these lenders are repre-
sented quite unevenly in different geographic areas. However, similar yield
differences exist within given metropolitan areas. In some places the inter-
lender differences are larger than those shown in Table 2, notably on the
West Coast, and sometimes they are smaller, as in the case of New York City.
The different lender groups also concentrate their activities in different
segments of the risk spectrum. Table 2 shows significant differences in ma-
turities, loan-value ratios, and property values among the different major
lending groups.
Our studies indicate, however, that yield differences persist even after
allowance for identifiable differences in characteristics of loan and borrower.
This conclusion follows from regression analysis covering savings and loan
associations, commercial banks, and mortgage companies in Chicago. Savings
and loan associations show the highest yield, commercial banks the lowest,
and mortgage companies are in between.
It may be, of course, that these lender differentials are explained by sta-
tistical inadequacies, including factors possibly affecting yield that we were
unable to measure, such as the age of the borrower or the prepayment pro-
vision of the mortgage. Fortunately, the differences between associations and
banks have been verified by a shopping study carried out in Chicago by Allen
S. Jung of the University of Chicago.3 Jung held everything else constant in
a way that we never can do statistically. For every lender being solicited
for a loan, he described the prospective borrower and the particulars of the
transaction in a standardized manner.
3 "Terms on Conventional Mortgage Loans on Existing Houses," Journal of
Finance, September 1962, pp. 432—443.The Mortgage Market 23
TABLE 2
Characteristics of Conventional First Mortgage
Loans, Originated by Major Lender Groups, for
Purchase of Previously Occupied Properties,
January -March1963
Effective Loan-to-
Interest Contract Value Value of
Ratea Rate Ratio Property Term
Lender Group(per cent)(per cent)(per cent) (dollars)(years)
Savings and
loan asso-
ciations 6.15 73.5 16,500 19.6
Commercial
banks 5.95 5.91 61.3 17,000 13.6
Mortgage
companies 5.86 5.76 69.8 27,400 22.6
Mutual
savings
banks 5.65 5.63 66.8 19,300 20.7
Life
insurance
companies 5.62 5.60 68.1 27,400 24.1
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
aContract rate adjusted to take account of fees and charges received by
lenders, assuming prepayment of principal after a period equal to half the
face maturity.
A number of possible explanations of lender differentials suggest them-
selves. Some bank loans, perhaps enough to affect the aggregate results, may
have a tie-in character wherein banks view the borrower (or a firm in which
the borrower holds a position of influence) as a possible customer for other
services. Of course, some bank borrowers are already customers. Second,
banks are not in the mortgage market continuously, and when they come
in they may find it necessary to offer attractive rates in order to draw cus-
tomers from the established lenders in this field.
In addition to yield differences between types of lenders, there are
differences within any given type. In the case of both savings and loan24 Part II
associations and commercial banks, yields tend to be inversely related
to the size of lender (after taking account of other yield-determining
factors), but the tendency is not uniform. In the case of associations,
those in the smallest of nine asset-size classifications obtain the high-
est rates, but the lowest rates are found among lenders of intermediate
size. Among banks, the highest rates are found among smaller-size
groups and the lowest in the largest-size group, but the very smallest
lenders have rates in the intermediate range. Among the factors that
may account for these yield differences by size of lender are differences
in lending cost and in location within the area.
Even among the large insurance companies there seem to be some
systematic differences in yields on similar mortgages made by different
companies, but our analysis of this has not gone far enough to justify
any generalizations regarding the nature or causes of these differences.
SIZE OF LOAN
Guttentag views the loan size as a double-edged variable. On the
one hand, loan size is related to cost per dollar of loan. Since a larger
loan may cost no more in the aggregate to put on the books, this may
justify a lower yield. A net cost of only $200 to put a $10,000 loan on
the books is the equivalent of about 1/4percent in yield; for a $5,000
loan, it is about 1/2 per cent. On the other hand, loan size affects bor-
rower risk. A larger loan with given level of customer income, for
example, implies reduced income coverage of debt service, and this
works toward higher rates.
In most but not all of Guttentag's regressions, loan size is inversely
related to yield, after maturity, loan-to-value ratio, and borrower's
income are held constant,4 suggesting that the cost effect dominates.
When the regressions are limited to mortgages having relatively low
4Theterms "regression equation" and "b-coefficient" will appear frequently in
the following analysis. Their meaning can be simply explained. If we suppose that
yields vary with the size of loan and by appropriate statistical analysis of observed
data we derive the statement "yield (per cent) =6.00—.02x sizeof loan," we
have written a "regression equation." Note that this would make it possible to de-
termine (within a margin of error) the yield of a mortgage if we knew only the
size of loan. If we used only one explanatory variable, as in this case, we should
expect the margin of error to be very great. By adding more explanatory variables,
such as monthly mortgage payment, our equation will presumably improve our
estimate of what the yield would be, and can also indicate more precisely what
the effect of loan sizeis when the other variables are taken into account. The
statistical analysis alone, however, cannot tell us whether the loan size "causes" theThe Mortgage Market 25
income-loan ratios, however, where borrower risk presumably is high,
the relation is positive, implying that in these cases the addition of
further borrower risk associated with a large loan more than offsets
the effect of its lower cost. Continuing again with Guttentag's report:
Yet it is not at all clear that cost explains the entire negative component
of the relation between loan size and yield. Studies of rate structure on
other instruments, including Avery Cohan's study of direct placements, also
show a very pronounced negative relationship between loan size and rate.
The cost factor must be of negligible importance on direct placements be-
cause of their large size, and the presumption is that large placements carry
lower rates because of their correlation with size of borrower; larger bor-
rowers may generally have a stronger credit position, a stronger bargaining
position, or both. It is interesting, however, that Cohan found the size of a
direct placement to have a significant negative influence on yield even when
two measures of firm size were included in the regression(total capitaliza-
tion and earnings before interest and taxes). A sophisticated mortgage lender
to whom I posed this problem remarked that "large loans carry stature,"
which is a remark worth pondering.
LOAN-VALUE RATIO
The observed differences among yields on mortgage loans are ex-
plained in large measure by differences in risk. One important risk
variable is the size of loan relative to property value. Guttentag found
that:
Higher loan-to-value ratios generally are associated with higher yields,
whether other variables are taken account of or not. The general relation
is illustrated in Table 3, drawn from the FHLBB survey, which is a simple
classification that does not take into account intercorrelation between the
loan-to-value ratio and other yield-determining variables.
On a priori grounds we would not expect the relation of the loan-to-value
ratio to yield to be linear. One might even expect that there would be critical
levels above which variability would make a considerable difference and be-
yield to be about what the equation asserts, or whether factors not included in the
regression but associated with both yield and size produce the result.
Note that in the example above the last term is "—.02 X size of loan." This clearly
indicates that when loan size rises, yield falls. The number "—.02"in this case is
sometimes called the "b-coefficient" or the "regression coefficient" for loan size. Thus
a negative regression coefficient means that changes in the variable involved will
cause mortgage yields to move in the opposite direction, and conversely with positive
regression coefficients. (The numbers in this example have no significance at all;
they are purely illustrative.)26 Part II
TABLE 3
Effective Interest Rate on Conventional










Under 55.0 5.74 6.03 5.98
55.1-60.0 5.78 6.10 6.02
60.1-65.0 5.84 6.06 6.07
65.1-70.0 5.88 6.11 6.14
70.1-75.0 5.83 6.09 6.10
75.1-80.0 6.13 6.27 6.34
Above 80.0 6.24 6.25
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
low which it would make little difference. The data in Table 3 do indeed
suggest that 75 per cent is such a critical level. It is worth noting in this
connection that on conventional mortgages legal maximum loan-value ratios
for life insurance companies and mutual savings banks exceed 75 per cent
in only a few states.
Because of intercorrelation between the loan-to-value ratio and other mort-
gage characteristics, and because of the wide coverage of lenders and areas
in these data, however, this critical ratio of 75 per cent could be largely
illusory. One would expect that the critical level would vary for different
groups, depending on the general level of other risk variables. Multiple re-
gression analysis of the Chicago data, where the loan-to-value ratio is ana-
lyzed in terms of seven separate groups, broadly confirms this. On conven-
tional loans made by savings and loan associations secured by existing houses,
there were significant yield differences between the 30—40 per cent loan-to-
value group and below-SO per cent group. In the case of loans on new houses
by associations, the loan-to-value ratio does not become important until the
50 per cent level. In the case of mortgage companies, it does not become im-
portant until the 70 per cent level, and is not very important even then.
On FHA and VA mortgages, where loan-to-value ratios generally ranged
much higher, the regression coefficients were often statistically significant,
though not quantitatively large.The Mortgage Market 27
The loan-to-value ratio is closely related to term to maturity, which
will be discussed next.
TERM TO MATURITY
Crude yield curves for mortgages often appear to be negatively
sloped, a fact of special interest because bond yield curves have been
predominantly of positive slope for the past thirty-five To un-
derstand the meaning of this frequent negative slope in mortgage
yield curves, or even to verify its existence, is a complex task. Indeed,
the influence of term to maturity on yield is one of the most difficult to
unravel for many reasons. First, maturity affects yield in a variety of
ways, some of these even being in opposite directions, hence tending
to cancel each other Out. Second, maturity is sometimes correlated
with other loan or borrower characteristics that influence yield, and
hence influence the relationship of yield and maturity. Third, the as-
sociation between maturity and yield is often nonlinear and difficult
to identify. Fourth, the relation between maturity and yield may re-
flect the preferences of lenders for long or short loans, and attitudes
are often difficult to ascertain with confidence and always difficult to
measure. Each of these features of maturity analysis requires further
discussion.
Maturity is related to risk through two channels which happen to
be offsetting in their effect. Guttentag distinguishes borrower risk
from property risk. Borrower risk refers to the possibility that the
borrower will be unable to service the loan. Property risk refers to the
possibility that the value of the underlying property will, sometime
over its life, fall below the outstanding loan balance, thus encourag-
ing default and increasing loss to the lender if default occurs. A longer
maturity reduces the borrower's monthly mortgage payment, thus
raising the income coverage and reducing the borrower risk.6 How-
5Ayield curve is one that relates yield to term to maturity, measuring yield
on the vertical axis and maturity on the horizontal. If long-term securities yield the
highest returns, this curve will slope upward to the right, which is called a posi-
tive slope. Conversely, if long-term yields are lower than short yields the curve
slopes downward to the right and is said to be negatively sloped.
6Overa longer period, of course, more things can happen to affect borrower risk,
but it is not clear a priori in which direction the effect would run. The difference
in actual life between short and long maturity mortgages is due largely to the
higher assumption rate on long maturity mortgages; i.e., long maturity mortgages
are less often paid off when homes are sold, the purchaser assuming the seller's
mortgage obligation rather than taking out a new mortgage. Whether assumptions
increase or decrease mortgage risk is problematical.28 Part II
ever, a mortgage of longer maturity implies a smaller accumulated
repayment of principal after any given period, and therefore a smaller
margin between outstanding debt and property value, which raises
property It follows that if we were to consider the risk factor only,
a priori reasoning suggests several possible yield curves. First, if bor-
rower risk predominates, we might expect a negatively sloped yield
curve, reflecting the lower risk of longer Second, if prop-
erty risk predominates, we might expect a positive slope, reflecting
the higher risk on longer loans. A third possibility is that the yield
curve might be U-shaped, reflecting first the predominant influence
of declining borrower risk and then rising as increasing property risk
assumes the ascendency.
Guttentag's first step was to disentangle the maturity from the
loan-to-value ratio, with which it is highly correlated. He did this by
calculating average yields for several maturity groups cross-classified
by loan-to-value ratio, and by constructing multiple regression equa-
tions describing mortgage yield as a function of term to maturity and
loan-to-value ratio. The coefficient of the term to maturity in these
equations indicates the slope of the curve when the other variable
(loan-to-value ratio) is held constant.
In almost all cases these procedures resulted in negative sloping
yield curves or U-shaped curves that were negative on balance. The
negative slope was more pronounced in the case of loans on existing
houses than on new houses.
Next Guttentag tested the hypothesis that the influence of prop-
erty risk, if it could be disentangled from borrower risk, would be to
give the yield curve a positive slope. To do this, he added to the re-
gression other independent variables which appear likely to be re-
lated to borrower risk. Four combinations of such variables were
tried: borrower income and loan size, the ratio of income to loan
size, income and the monthly mortgage payment, and the ratio of
income to mortgage payment. If these variables could pick up the
borrower risk component of the maturity, then the maturity would
A complication not considered here is that borrower risk may also be affected
by the accumulated equity; i.e., borrowers may be more inclined to default if their
equity is small.
8Asnoted later, however, the analytical foundations of a negatively sloped curve
are less than firm.The Mortgage Market 29
only carry property risk; and since property risk increases as maturi-
ties lengthen, the yield curve should tilt upward.
Although these tests have not been completed, the results so far
indicate that the inclusion of these variables has little effect on the
yield curve. Their inclusion in regression equations does sometimes
reduce the extent of negative slope, as expected, but the shifts are
invariably small and in no case is the result an unambiguously posi-
tively sloping curve.
Guttentag hypothesized that the reason for this might be that the
relation between maturity and property risk was nonlinear. In other
words, changes in property risk from changes in maturity might be
very small if the general level of property risk was small to begin
with because of low loan-to-value ratios. Where this is the case, one
would not expect much, if any, positive slope in the yield curve even
though the borrower-risk component of the maturity was completely
eliminated. To test this possibility Guttentag ran separate regressions,
covering savings and loan associations only, for loans in four loan-to-
value groups on existing houses and two loan-to-value groups in the
case of new houses. This provided some but not very strong support
for the property-risk hypothesis. Thus, on existing houses the negative
slope was significantly steeper for the lowest loan-to-value group (less
than 60 per cent) than for the highest (75 per cent and over), while the
slopes of the other two groups were in between. But the slope re-
mained slightly negative even on the highest loan-to-value group. This
was true both before and after the inclusion of other variables de-
signed to absorb the effects of borrower risk. In the case of loans on
new houses, furthermore, slopes were not significantly different as be-
tween the two loan-to-value groups (above 75 per cent, and 75 per
cent and below); in both cases the yield curve was U-shaped and per-
haps slightly negative on balance. Thus, even on high loan-to-value
mortgages, Guttentag has not succeeded in finding positively sloped
yield curves, and the most that can be said is that on these mortgages
the property-risk component of the maturity may result in a somewhat
less pronounced negative slope.
What is responsible for the negative slope? At the outset it was
suggested that the borrower-risk component of the maturity could
generate a negative slope. Yet the evidence indicated to Guttentag that
this is not the answer. If the negative slope reflected borrower risk,30 Part II
the inclusion in regression equations of variables that are related to
borrower risk, such as the income-to-loan ratio, should eliminate a
good part if not all of the negative slope; as indicated above, this is
not the case.
As a further test of the possibility that the negative slope reflects
borrower risk, Guttentag ran separate regressions for several groups
of mortgages classified by income-to-loan ratio. The logic of the test
was as follows. If negative slope reflects borrower risk, then the slope
should be greatest when borrower risk is high, because variations in
maturity would then have a significant effect on this risk; the slope
should thus be greatest for mortgages with low income-to-loan ratios.
But the negative slope should largely disappear when high income-to-
loan ratios make borrower risk so low that changes in it associated
with changes in maturity have little effect. In the existing-house cate-
gory he ran separate regressions for three income/loan-size groups in
each of two loan-to-value classes (those below 60 per cent and those
over 75 per cent). Similarly, on new houses, he ran regressions on two
income/loan-size groups in each of the two loan-to-value classes (above
and below 75 per cent). In general, the differences in slopes between
the different income/loan-size groups were not statistically significant,
as they should have been if borrower risk tended to produce negatively
sloped yield curves.
The argument that the negative slope of mortgage yield curves re-
flects borrower risk must assume that people want to be forced to save
and will pay a premium to be so forced. Despite the evidence that this
kind of psychology exists in some contexts, neither Guttentag nor I
find the argument persuasive in this situation.
Again the question arises, what does explain the negative slope if
it is not borrower risk?
It should be pointed out that the negative slope here discussed can-
not be explained by the fact that longer-maturity mortgages are, on
the average, also larger loans, and that for this reason the cost of
making the transaction is lower per dollar of loan. The reason this
explanation must be ruled out is that many of the regressions used in
deriving our yield curves hold size of loan constant.
One possible explanation of the negative slope of the yield curve
is that the relevant factor is the age of existing properties, on which
no statistical data are available. Lenders may limit the maturity onThe Mortgage Market 31
those old properties which also carry high property risk, thus causing
short maturities to be associated with greater risk and hence to pro-
vide greater yields. (On new houses, it will be remembered, it is not
clear whether the negative slope of the curve was statistically sig-
nificant.)
Another possible explanation of the negatively sloped yield curve
is that many buyers of mortgages, especially life insurance companies,
prefer long investments to short. Such a preference could reflect the
desire to minimize frequency of reinvestment, and also a preference
for income security, without concern over prematurity fluctuation of
capital values. Evidence in support of this explanation was found in
the fact that the yield curves of FHA mortgages, which carry small
risk, revealed no slope at all for commercial banks but a negative
slope for mortgage companies. Commercial banks would be expected
to have some concern over prematurity price fluctuations, but mort-
gage companies sell largely to life insurance companies.
On the other hand, evidence against this hypothesis is seen in the
fact that even for mortgage companies the negative slope is concen-
trated entirely in the existing-house category, raising the possibility
that here also the age of property may be the relevant factor. Lender
preferences, furthermore, may not be as important a determinant of
term structure in mortgages as in bonds. Residential mortgages today
seldom have maturities of less than eight to ten years, and this is
already beyond the point where yield curves covering bonds show the
steepest slope. The majority of mortgages, furthermore, are paid in
full before maturity, so that face maturity is a much less reliable guide
to actual life than in the case of bonds.
Borrower's Income. Guttentag's analysis of the influence of borrow-
er's income has not progressed far, and results to date have not been
very satisfactory. It would be expected that on loans of given character-
istics (maturity, loan-to-value ratio and loan amount), borrowers with
high income would pay a lower rate because of lower borrower risk.
In fact, the b-coefficient for income in regression equations, including
the three variables indicated above, is sometimes positive and some-
times negative. When mortgages are segregated by income-loan ratio,
regressions covering low income-to-loan mortgages show the expected
negative coefficient, while the high income-loan groups show positive
coefficients. We suspect that the income variable may be associated32 PartII
with some factor not yet identified by Guttentag, which bears a posi-
tive relation to yield.
Other Observations
The cyclical timing of mortgage rates, as compared with that of other
security yields, looks interesting, and we hope it may shed further
light on the determinants of interest rates generally. On the basis of
very incomplete data, it appears that the well-known tendency of
mortgage rates to lag behind bonds is appreciably reduced by the
use of authorization dates instead of disbursement dates, but itis
not entirely eliminated. The amplitude of the yield series for all resi-
dential mortgages authorized by life insurance companies (conven-
tional, FHA, and VA) appears to be somewhat less than that of gov-
ernment obligations and high-grade corporate bonds, but not much
different from that of low-grade corporates and the series on FHA
mortgages published by that agency.